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Abstract. For applications like Terrorist Watch Lists and Smart Guns, a false
rejection is more critical than a false acceptance. In this paper a new threat model
focusing on false rejections is presented, and the “standard” architecture of a
biometric system is extended by adding components like crypto, audit logging,
power, and environment to increase the analytic power of the threat model. Our
threat model gives new insight into false rejection attacks, emphasizing the role
of an external attacker. The threat model is intended to be used during the design
of a system.
1 Introduction
Biometric authentication systems are used to identify people, or to verify the claimed
identity of registered users when entering a protected perimeter. Typical application do-
mains include air-and seaports, banks, military installations, etc. For most of these sys-
tems the main threat is an authorized user gaining access to the system. This is called
a false acceptance threat. Currently, new applications that have a completely different
threat model are emerging. For example, Terrorist Watch List applications and Smart
Guns applications are characterized by the fact that a false rejection could lead to life
threatening situations. Terrorist watch list applications currently use facial recognition
or fingerprint recognition [1]. Watch lists are mainly used in ports to identify terrorists.
For this application, the main threat is a false rejection which means that a potential
terrorist on the list is not recognized. A false acceptance results in a convenience prob-
lem, since legitimate subjects are denied access and their identity needs to be examined
more carefully to get access.
Smart guns are weapons that will fire only when operated by the rightful owner.
Such guns are intended to reduce casualties among police officers whose guns are taken
during a struggle. The most promising biometric for this application is grip pattern
recognition [15]. Again, a false rejection is the most serious threat as this would result
in a police officer not being able to use the weapon when necessary. For a police officer
to trust his gun the false reject rate must be below 10−4, which is the accepted failure
rate for police weapons in use.
We propose 3W trees (Who, hoW, What) for identifying false rejection threats to
biometric security systems. Analysis based on a 3W tree leads to concrete questions
regarding the security of the system. Questions raised by other methods (e.g. attack
trees) do not lead to the same level of specific questions. A similar approach is taken
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by de Cock et al. in [3], when modeling threats for security tokens in web applications.
Our method is more concrete than other methods because we make explicit assumptions
about the generic architecture of the system, thus exposing all main components in the
architecture that are vulnerable to attack. Our method is not less general than other
methods because other architectural assumptions can be plugged in easily. Our method
is intended to be used as a design aid.
Section 2 is an overview of points of vulnerability in biometric authentication sys-
tems. The extended architecture of a biometric authentication system is presented in
Section 3. Section 4 describes 3W trees the method proposed for identifying false re-
jection attacks and in Section 5 we apply this 3W tree to the Terrorist Watch List and to
the Smart Gun. The last section concludes and suggests further work.
2 Related Work
Like all security systems, biometric systems are vulnerable to attacks [7, 12]. One spe-
cific attack consists of presenting fake inputs such as false fingerprints [4] to a bio-
metric system. To analyze such threats systematically various threat models have been
developed. We discuss the most important models: the Biometric Device Protection
Profile (BDPP) [6], the Department of Defense & Federal Biometric System Protec-
tion Profile for Medium Robustness Environments (DoDPP) [8], the U.S. Government
Biometric Verification Mode Protection Profile for Medium Robustness Environments
(USGovPP) [10] and Information Technology-Security techniques -A Framework for
Evaluation and Testing of Biometric Technology (ITSstand) [5]. In the sequel we refer
to these three protection profiles and the ITSstand simply as “the standards”.
In many ways, the standards are similar. In particular, they do not make a clear
distinction between a false rejection and a false acceptance attack. A total of 48 distinct
threats are identified of which only 3 are false rejection threats. These are: (1) cutting
the power to the system, (2) flooding hardware components with noise and (3) exposing
the device to environmental parameters that are outside its operating range. In addition,
there are 12 “catch all” threats with both false rejection and false acceptance threats.
It is difficult to compare threats amongst the four standards. For example, BDPP
contains one T.TAMPER threat while ITSstand contains three tamper related threats:
one for hardware tampering another for software or firmware tampering and one for
channel tampering . In ITSstand tampering and bypassing is mentioned when describing
the same threat while BDPP explicitly mentions the T.BYPASS threat.
ITSstand is the most complete in identifying false rejection threats, it identifies the
largest number (8) of such rejections (See [5] [threats 8.4, 10.2, 11.2, 13.1, 13.3, 14.1,
14.3, 15.1]). However, only threat 13.3 is a clear false rejection. All the others are “catch
all” threats. There are three tamper related threats: one related to hardware tampering
(13.1), one related to software tampering (14.1) and one for channel tampering (15.1).
These threats are general, not specifying the exact point in the system that is vulnerable,
or the circumstances that make the system vulnerable to attack. The method of attack
is also not clear, all that is said is that hardware can be tampered with, bypassed or
deactivated. These threats lack the exact how and where. The key idea of our 3W tree
is that it provides the missing how and where to the analyst.
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Attack trees offer a related method of analyzing attacks [14]. The root of the tree is
identified with the goal of compromising a system. The goals of the children of a node
could be the compromise of a sub-system or a contribution thereof, and so on recursively.
The main disadvantage of attack trees is that they provide only the choice between and-
/or-nodes. This does only provides a low level way of breaking up a goal up into sub-goals.
The general recommendation is to think hard, which does not provide much guidance.
Bolle et al. [13] identifies 9 threats that plague biometric systems. Their opinion is
that many questions about how to make biometric authentication work without creat-
ing additional security loopholes remain unanswered and that little work is being done
presently in this area. Our paper contributes to filling this gap.
3 Biometric Authentication Generic System Architecture
Ratha et al. [12] provide a systematic analysis of different points of attack in a biometric
authentication system. Their analysis is based on a generic architecture of a biometric
system, as illustrated in Fig. 1.
Fig. 1. General view of a Biometric Authentication System showing 17 points of attack
Each of the components as well as the connecting channels are potential targets
of attack. Comparing these targets of attack to the threats identified in the standards we
discovered some threats that do not have a corresponding target of attack in the architec-
ture. For example in the architecture nothing is mentioned about the power that makes
the electric equipment work. Cutting the power to the system will make the system
fail. Therefore, we extend the generic biometric architecture to include the following
components also shown in figure 1:
(a) Cryptography, for ensuring the authenticity and integrity of data stored and trans-
mitted on channels. The standards identify threats related to cryptography as fol-
lows: T.CRYPT ATTK in DoDPP, T.CRYPT ATTACK and
T.CRYPTO COMPROMISE in USGovPP.
(b) Audit, important actions need to be recorded for later analysis. In the case of the
Smart Gun application it is particularly important to have a record of which user
fired the gun at what time. The auditing process itself can be subject to an attack
for example T.AUDIT COMPROMISE, DoDPP.
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(c) Power, is a major concern especially when the biometric device is portable. For
example, replacing the power source might restart the application causing the bio-
metric system to enter an unknown or unstable state. This attack is related to threat
T.POWER in BDPP, DoDPP, ITSstand, and T.UNKOWNSTATE in USGovPP.
(d) Environment and users, this is general but we also include in this category: operat-
ing parameters such as temperature, humidity, etc. Threats related to users identi-
fied in the standards are T.BADUSER, T.BADADMIN, T.BADOPER in BDPP and
DoDPP (T.BADOPER is not present in that document), USGovPP does not contain
T.BADUSER and T.BADOPER but it contains two threats related to a bad adminis-
trator, namely T.ADMIN ERROR and T.ADMIN ROGUE and in ITSstand they are
labeled as: 8.1, 8.2, 8.3 and 8.4. Other threats are T.FAILSECURE, T.DEGRADE
presented in DoDPP.
This concludes the extension of the architecture of Ratha et al. [13], by adding 7 com-
ponents that could influence the performance and security of a biometric system.
4 3W Trees
The attack classifications from the standards are too coarse. For example threat T.UN-
DETECT in BDPP says: An undetected attack against the TOE security functions is
mounted by an attacker, which eventually succeeds in either allowing illegal access to
the portal, or denying access to authorized users. Nothing is said about the type of
attack except that it is undetected and that the result can be either a false acceptance or
a false rejection. To solve this problem we propose a more detailed analysis using 3W
trees to give concrete insights in potential attacks, without burdening the analyst with
irrelevant detail.
Three relevant grounds of distinctions are identified in the general security tax-
onomies in the literature, namely the who, the how and the what. We use each of these
grounds of distinction at different levels of the 3W tree (Fig. 2).
The first level of the 3W tree is a classical who taxonomy from the attacker’s position
relative to the system [9]. Attackers are divided in three classes. Class I attackers or
external attackers, lack knowledge about the system and have moderately sophisticated
Fig. 2. 3W tree of attacks on biometric systems. T1-T17 are points of attack shown in Fig. 1.
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equipment. Class II attackers or internal attackers are knowledgeable insiders, which
are highly educated and have access to most parts of the system. Class III attackers are
funded organization with ample resources that are able to assemble teams and design
sophisticated attacks. It is widely acknowledged that there is no protection against class
III attackers. The general opinion is that a system is considered secure if it can withstand
class I and class II attackers.
As a second level the 3W tree we use the Rae and Wildman taxonomy for secure
devices [11]. This is a how taxonomy:
– passive approach, the attacker may be in the proximity of the device, but cannot
touch the device;
– active approach, the attacker can interfere with the device (e.g. over a network) and
transmit data to the device from either an insecure or a secure domain.
– handles the device physically, but cannot break tamper evident seals on the device;
– possesses the device i.e. can open the device and break tamper evident seals with
impunity;
The classes presented are related to one another. Possessing the device means that the
attacker can handle the device and of course may approach the device. This relationship
can be formalized as :
passive approach ⊂ active approach ⊂ handle⊂ possession
The third level of the 3W tree , the what, deals with the threats our system might be
subject to. For a description of the first 10 attacks T1-T10 we refer the reader to the Bolle
et al. [13]. In addition to threats T1-T10 of Bolle et al. [13] we identify threats T11-T17:
T11. The channel that links the power source to the system is destroyed.
T12. The power source of the system is tampered with.
T13. An attacker may prevent future audit records from being recorded by attacking
the channel that transports the audit information.
T14. Audit records may be deleted or modified, thus masking an intruder action.
T15. Security functions may be defeated through cryptanalysis on encrypted data, i.e.
compromise of the cryptographic mechanisms.
T16. Users, regardless of the role that they play in the system, can compromise the
security functions.
T17. The environment (temperature, humidity, lighting, etc.) and extensive usage can
degrade the security function of the system
In our opinion, threats T1-T13 should be addressed by security mechanisms and threats
T14-T17 should be addressed by operational security procedures.
Finally, in keeping with our observation made earlier about the increasing impor-
tance of studying false rejections we add as a fourth layer the distinction between false
acceptance and false rejection. What makes our layered taxonomy biometric specific
is that: (1) the points of vulnerability T1-T17 refer to a biometric system and (2) we
consider two specific effects of each attack: a false acceptance or a false rejection.
This concludes the presentation of the 3W tree for identifying attacks on a general
biometric authentication system in the design phase, which allows us to classify known
attacks and to identify the possibility of new attacks in a systematic manner. This is the
subject of the next section.
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5 External Attack Scenarios
A scenario is a path in the 3W tree of figure 2. A scenario is named as xiy where:
– x ∈ {PA, AA, HA, PO}, PA stands for passive approach, AA stands for active
approach, HA stands for handle and PO for possession.
– i ∈ {1..17} indicates threat T i.
– y ∈ {A, R}, where A means an attack leading to a false acceptance attack and R
means an attack leading to a false rejection attack.
Each path in the tree corresponds to a threat that has to be evaluated. For example, sce-
nario PO1A identifies the following: in the possession situation (denoted by the letters
PO), threat T 1 (presenting a fake biometric/tampering with the sensor) to obtain a false
acceptance (A). To describe and evaluate scenarios we use the following attributes:
I Scenario: name of the evaluated scenario.
I Tactics: describe a possibility to realize this attack.
I Name: the name of the attack in the literature or a link to a paper that describes this
attack (if known).
II Damage: the estimated consequence of the attack for the device. The possibilities
are: minor, moderate, major. An attack with minor consequences will temporarily
damage the device. A moderate consequence attack will temporarily damage the
device but it needs specialized personnel to repair it. An attack with major con-
sequence will completely ruin the device, and the whole or parts of it need to be
replaced.
II Knowledge: lists the knowledge that an intruder must have to launch the attack. The
categories are: common sense, high school education, expert.
II Occurrence: an educated guess of the probability that such an attack occurs. The
estimators are: low (unlikely to have such an attack), medium (it might happen),
high (likely to happen).
III Countermeasures: some notes on how this attack might be prevented, or how at
least to diminish its consequence.
Below we present two examples, showing that analysis based on the 3W tree leads
to asking relevant questions about threats on biometric authentication systems. In the
Technical Report version of this paper all 4 × 17 = 68 threats are analyzed [2]. From
68 possible threats, 13 are considered serious threats. From these 13 threats, 6 have are
likely to occur and 12 have major consequences for the integrity of the device.
Example 1: Smart Gun Significant numbers of police weapons are lost or stolen. Each
year several police officers die or are injured because their own weapons are used
against them. The Smart Gun application is designed for a police force, which would
like to render a weapon inoperative when it is captured by the assailant of a police offi-
cer. The requirements include that a gun should recognize all members of a police pa-
trol, and that wearing gloves should not affect the operation. The PO4R attack, shown
in Table 1 is a tamper attack. All standards mention tamper attacks but do not detail
the point in the system where the tampering might occur. However, a tamper attack is
relatively easy to perform and the consequences are high: the gun is not working. By
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Table 1. PO4R Scenario in the Smart Gun application
I. Scenario Can an attacker in the possession situation attack the communication channel
between the feature extractor and the matcher in order to produce a false rejec-
tion?
I. Tactics Physically breaking the channel is the most obvious choice. To destroy
wires/connections inside the electronic device we have the following possibili-
ties: exposing the object to extreme values of pressure, temperature etc. and at
some point the mechanical connections will break.
I. Name Physical tampering.
II. Damage High. If the template extractor is out of order the gun will not work correctly.
II. Knowledge Expert. The attacker must know how to open the gun and which device is the
template extractor and then reassemble the gun.
II. Occurrence Medium. The result of such an attack is a gun that is not working properly in
the hands of the rightful user. If he wants to harm the user there are other ways
in which he has more control over what is happening. (i.e pulling a knife)
III. Counter
measures
A seal on the gun handle seems to be most appropriate. The seal must ensure
that even if the attacker can open the gun, resealing the device would be easily
detectable. It should be possible to discover the details of such an attack from
an audit log.
pointing out the specific points of attack, our analysis, suggests that a seal is needed on
the gun handle where the electronics are located. A tamper evident seal would indicate
the police officer whether the integrity of the weapon has been violated.
Example 2: Terrorist Watch Lists are used to detect terrorists while traveling. Applica-
tions like this are usually installed at airports, seaports, main railway stations etc. Peo-
Table 2. AA1R Scenario in Terrorist Watch List Application
I. Scenario Can an active attacker produce a false rejection by tampering with the input
device (video camera)?
I. Tactics An active attacker can interfere with the camera using mirrors to reflect sun
light on the camera, affecting the quality of the image. The similarity between
the newly acquired sample and stored biometric sample might then be below
the threshold.
I. Name Unknown.
II. Damage Minor. The personnel in charge of supervising the cameras will eventually no-
tice that something is wrong.
II. Knowledge Common sense. Children play with watches projecting light on surfaces to an-
noy their teachers.




To ensure that light beams cannot be projected on the camera. This can be
done by carefully positioning the camera, detecting changes in lighting con-
ditions,etc..
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ple who want to travel are checked against a central database with potentially dangerous
persons. There are at least two ways to do the matching: using the name (which can eas-
ily be forged) or a biometric feature like face or fingerprint. We consider the case where
the terrorist watch list is implemented using face recognition. The intended use is as fol-
lows: a camera is placed at a passport control point and before issuing the stamp the per-
son is asked to look at the camera using a neutral expression. The officer in charge will
check if the individual is acting as asked. We show that attacking the camera following
an active approach is feasible, see table 2. We could not find any mention of this attack
in the literature. Again, our 3W tree helps to ask the right question during the analysis.
6 Conclusions
Existing biometric protection profiles and standards by and large define the same set of
attacks. However, their focus is mainly on false acceptance attacks. Attacks that result
in a false acceptance or false rejection are often put in the same class. Threats that could
only lead to a false rejection are largely ignored.
In new applications like Terrorist Watch Lists or Smart Guns, false rejection attacks
are more important than false acceptance attacks. We propose 3W trees as a flexible
tool to highlight false rejection or false acceptance attacks depending on the type of
application. Our threat model gives new insight into false rejection attacks emphasizing
the role of an external attacker.
The advantage of the 3W tree is that (1) its fosters a systematic approach to threat
analysis, (2) allows asking concrete questions, and (3) does not burden the analysis with
irrelevant detail. Analyzing a 3W tree helps us to develop scenarios. For evaluating and
describing scenarios we propose a model consisting of: tactics, name, consequence,
estimated knowledge, estimated probability, countermeasure. In two detailed examples
we identify appropriate countermeasures to attacks. For the smart gun example we argue
that there must be a seal on the gun handle to protect the electronics inside the gun. For
the terrorist watch list we argue that the camera should be positioned in a way that
would prevent a light beam to be reflected on the camera. The main advantage of the
3W tree is that relevant threats are identified.
This research is supported by Technology Foundation STW. We thank Jeroen Doumen
and Ruud van Munster for their comments on the paper.
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